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Issue 1

COURT REPORTS

sufficient evidence to determine the effects the transfers would have
on the hydrological system; therefore, the state engineer should have
required the USFWS to conduct further studies. The court of appeals
agreed with the district court, holding that the state engineer had
substantial evidence to consider, including two groundwater studies
prepared by the United States Geological Survey and an EIS for the
eight transfers prepared by the USFWS as required by the Settlement
Act. Evidence also showed that two of the water rights at issue were in
an area that was not a significant geological recharge zone and that the
remaining six rights were from an area no longer suited for
agricultural use. Considering all of the evidence available, the court
held the state engineer acted well within his authority in choosing not
to require any further studies, granted the transfer permits, and
dismissed Fallon and Churchill's protests.
Churchill and Fallon also contended that each transfer should
have been contemplated in relationship to the effects that all planned
transfers for the wetlands restoration would have on the hydrological
system; therefore, the state engineer erred in only considering the
transfers on an individual basis. The court pointed out that Nevada
law only requires the state engineer to make an assessment of a
proposed transfer on an individual basis and to hold otherwise would
expand the discretionary authority of the state engineer beyond the
limits listed in applicable state statutes.
Finally, Fallon and Churchill asserted the state engineer should
have determined the adequacy of the EIS prepared by the USFWS in
compliance with NEPA. Alternatively, they asserted the state engineer
should have put any action on the transfer petitions on hold while
litigation was pending before the court of appeals on the USFWS'
compliance with NEPA. With no parallel provision in Nevada law, the
court held that the state engineer correctly ruled he had no authority
to determine compliance with a federal statute. With regard to
delaying action on the water right transfers, the state engineer did not
issue the transfers until after the district court had ruled in favor of the
USFWS. By the time this case came before the court, the appellate
court had already affirmed the district court's decision regarding the

EIS, making the issue moot. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals thus
affirmed the district court's ruling upholding the validity of the water
right transfers granted to the USFWS.
Sean . Biddle
United States v. Braren, 338 F.3d 971 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that
dispute seeking to clarify both Klamath Tribes' water rights and assess
propriety of water rights standard not ripe for federal adjudication).
Over the last twenty-five years, the United States, the Klamath
Tribes ("Tribes"), and numerous individual landowners have sought to
determine water rights to the Klamath River Basin ("Basin") in
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Oregon. In 1979, the United States District Court for the District of
Oregon announced standards for prioritizing how water is applied to
fulfill water rights granted by treaty to the Tribes, but left to Oregon
the task of allocating water to each of the Basin claimants. After the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
district court's findings, Oregon developed and executed a
comprehensive administrative adjudication of over 5000 claims to
those rights.
Although adjudication was incomplete, the United States and the
Tribes initiated this action seeking a declaratory judgment that the
Tribes had a water right to support the gathering of plants and asking
the district court to clarify the nature and scope of the standards
announced in its earlier decision.
The district court issued a
declaratory judgment holding the Tribes had a water right to support
resources the Tribes gather, and announcing a two-part standard for
quantifying the water right. Oregon and several individual defendants
(collectively the "Brarens") appealed.
On appeal, Oregon argued the dispute was not ripe and that the
district court should have abstained from exercising its jurisdiction;
the Brarens appealed the district court's declaration of the two-part
standard for quantifying water rights. The court agreed with Oregon
that the dispute was not ripe and as a result did not address the
Brarens appeal.
In reaching its decision, the court outlined two components for
the determination of ripeness: constitutional ripeness and prudential
ripeness.
The court held that the facts sufficiently alleged
constitutional ripeness. A dispute is constitutionally ripe when there is
a "substantial controversy" between parties with adverse legal interests.
The court held that the conflict between Oregon and the Tribes
constituted a constitutionally ripe dispute. Oregon did not allege
otherwise.
The court, however, held the case did not satisfy the prudential
ripeness standard. To satisfy prudential ripeness, a party must show:
(1) fitness of the issues for judicial decision, and (2) hardship to the
parties should the court deny consideration.
Analyzing these
standards, the court found that this case failed both prongs of the
prudential ripeness requirement. First, the United States alleged that
the adjudication embraced a standard contrary to the Tribes' rights,
even though adjudication was nowhere near completion. However,
the court held the issues unfit for judicial decision because Oregon
had not officially adopted a standard to apply to federal water claims.
Second, the court found no resulting hardship to the United States
and the Tribes in waiting for additional factual developments. The
court stated that even if the district court's declaratory judgment were
enforced, the United States and the Tribes must nonetheless wait for
completion of adjudication to ultimately realize the relief sought.
The court thus held that the dispute was not ripe for federal
adjudication. The court vacated the district court's judgment and
remanded the case to the district court for entry of an order staying all

Issue 1

COURT REPORTS

federal proceedings pending completion of adjudication and related
appellate review.
Kyle K Chang
TENTH CIRCUIT
Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 333 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2003)
(holding the Bureau of Reclamation has discretion to reduce
previously contracted water deliveries to comply with the Endangered
Species Act; diversion of water for the protection of endangered
species constitutes a beneficial use; and delivery contracts between the
Bureau of Reclamation and the water district did not create a
perpetual and exclusive right to the water by the district).
This action was the culmination of twelve years of litigation
between non-profit environmental and conservation groups and the
federal agencies charged with administering water diversion and
storage facilities along the Middle Rio Grande. The basis of this action
was to determine whether the federal agencies had the discretion to
reduce deliveries of available water under its contracts with various
water districts in New Mexico to comply with the Endangered Species
Act ("ESA").
Defenders of Wildlife, Forest Guardians, National Audubon
Society, New Mexico Audubon Council, Sierra Club, and Southwestern
Environmental Center (collectively "Environmental Groups") initiated
the litigation leading to this appeal. The Environmental Groups, on
behalf of the Rio Grande silvery minnow and the Southwestern willow
flycatcher,' sued John W. Keys, III, Commissioner of the United States
Bureau of Reclamation ("BOR"), the United States Army Corp of
Engineers ("Corps") and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service
("FWS") (collectively "Federal Agencies") for violations of the ESA in
the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico.
The ESA created a process by which federal agencies must ensure
that no harm comes to endangered or threatened species or their
habitat. After the FWS proposes a species for listing and identifies its
habitat, the ESA is triggered. The ESA prohibits any action that would
irreparably harm or jeopardize an endangered or protected species or
destroy or adversely modify its habitat. Environmental Groups alleged
the federal agencies, by fulfilling their contracts with various water
districts, jeopardized the endangered Rio Grande silvery minnow.
The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico
1. Both species were named in the original complaint. The district court noted
that the Southwestern Willow Flycatcher had increased in total numbers, prompting
the parties to concentrate solely on the Silvery Minnow. The Tenth Circuit
subsequently confined their discussion to the Silvery Minnow.

